Do I need Bitcoin-qt to run Armory? - Bitcoin Stack Exchange

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Wallet Question: With an offline Armory wallet do I really need Bitcoin-QT? Can't I just generate an address on the offline computer and add that address to my Blockchain.info account as a watch only address? From there won't I be able to receive payments and view the balance?

Or am I missing something (like all of my bitcoins)?
submitted by btcnow to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Can I transfer bitcoins from a Armory wallet to bitcoin-qt without a transaction fee?

Is this possible? I don't want to waste my Satoshis on transactions when it is not necessary.
Thanks!
submitted by asdfasdf4r to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

In early 2013, it became a common belief that new Bitcoin users should not be recommended Bitcoin-QT, the full node client. Bitcoin.org was changed to no longer exclusively recommend it. Two years later, the block size conservatives are saying the drop in full node count was due to block size

I distinctly remember that the recommending of Bitcoin-QT to new Bitcoin users became a faux pas in early 2013. It was claimed that regular people should download and install an SPV client like Multibit.
Predictably, there was a large drop in the full node count, as the wallet market became dominated by a large number of new, light clients, and the most trafficked Bitcoin website, bitcoin.org, stopped exclusively recommending people to install Bitcoin-QT.
Now, we have important developers like Luke-Jr claiming that this 95% drop in full node count can be mainly attributed to the growing size of the block chain, despite the fact that the drop began right when light clients began being recommended..
EDIT to add some data:
This is the image that GMaxwell and Peter Todd, two individuals who are conservative about the block size (in particular Peter Todd, who's been warning about increasing the 1 MB size limit since 2013), have linked to to make their point about the full node count:
http://i.imgur.com/EL0zHRe.jpg
Up until at least March 18, 2013, the only client recommended to visitors of bitcoin.org was Bitcoin-QT, and an installation link for it was provided right on the landing page:
https://web.archive.org/web/20130318211940/http://bitcoin.org/
The WayBack Machine shows that by March 25th, 2013, this had changed, and a 'Choose Your Wallet' button appeared on Bitcoin.org/:
https://web.archive.org/web/20130513214959/http://bitcoin.org/en/
From March 25th 2013 onward, the number of non-full-node wallets recommended by bitcoin.org increased, in response to a general increase in the number of high quality and/or well marketed light and mobile wallets on the market.
Now a days, Bitcoin-QT is one of twelve clients displayed on bitcoin.org's Choose Your Wallet page:
https://bitcoin.org/en/choose-your-wallet
Other than Bitcoin-QT and Bitcoin Armory, all of them are non-full-node clients.
This shift, from a wallet market where only Bitcoin-QT was available and recommended to one that is increasingly diverse and dominated by light clients, coincides with the point (Spring 2013) where we start seeing a rapid decline in the full node count.
submitted by aminok to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

A Guide to Keeping Keys Offline Using Armory +rPi

Hi Redditors.
I am going to post in this thread my experiences in getting my Desktop (Debian) machine running Armory in watch-only mode, and coupling that with an offline Raspberry Pi (which holds my private keys) for signing the transactions previously made in watch-only mode.
I actually compiled Armory from source directly on my Pi. This guide is probably more for the bitcoin 'power user', as to run Armory online, and broadcast the signed transactions, you need to have a bitcoin full node running (bitcoind).
Basic requirements:
Aimed-for Setup:
I'll post the guide in digestible sections...

Section 1

I should begin by saying I installed source code from git, and got Armory to build the DB on my desktop initially, WITHOUT creating a wallet.. (This allowed me to debug what was going on a little!)
Go to Bitcoin.org, select Armory..
It leads to a Download from Git:
https://github.com/goatpig/BitcoinArmory/releases
Followed the procedure for Linux Debian verify code, compile, install, all straight-forward..
Began by running bitcoind, and telling Armory where to find it. This is the command I used, obviously it was all on one line and didn't include the arrows/explanations!:
python ArmoryQt.py \ --satoshi-datadir=/BlockChain/chain20180414/blocks \ # <-----(where my bitcoind blocks live) --datadir=/ArmoryDataDi \ # <-----(this is instead of ~/.armory) --dbdir=/ArmoryDataDidatabases # <-------(again, non std. place used for Armory's databases.. my choice.) 
So, on the Desktop, after the initial "build databases"
(NB the initial "Build Databases" took about 1.5h and my two CPUs were maxed the whole time, Temps up to 62C. Not ideal; Im not in a rush!)
I then wanted to import a watch-only wallet.
Before I did this, I took a full backup of the Armory data dir:
/ArmoryDataDi
(or ~/.armory in a default installation).
I'd hate to have to make Armory do another full sync with the bitcoind node!

Section 2

Next step: offline wallet (with Private Keys) is on a Raspberry Pi.
I downloaded the source and managed to compile it on the pi itself! :)
Though there were some gymnastics needed to setup the Pi.
My Pi is running Raspbian based on Wheezy.. quite old!
I did the following on the Pi:
apt-get update apt-get upgrade (<---took about an hour!) apt-get install autotools-dev apt-get install autoconf 
Then I followed the instructions exactly as I had done for my Debian Desktop machine, EXCEPT:
I had to increase the Pi's swap space. I upped it from 100Mb to 400Mb.
The compilation took 7 hours, and my poor SD card got a thrashing.
But after compilation, I put the Swap back to 100Mb and Armory runs ok with about 150Mb of memory (no swap needed).
Swap increase on the Pi:
use your favourite editor, and open the file /etc/dphys-swapfile
add/change the following line:
CONF_SWAPSIZE=400 
Then, REBOOT the Pi:
sudo shutdown -h -P now 
Once the compilation was done on the Pi, put the swap back, rebooted and created an Armory wallet.
I added manual entropy and upped the encryption 'time' from 250ms to 2500ms - since the Pi is slow, but I'll be happy to wait for more iterations in the Key Derivation Function.
Once the wallet was created, it obviously prompts you for backup.
I want to add a private key of my own (i.e. import), so don't do the backup until this is over.
I import my Private Key, and Armory checks that this corresponds to a Public Key, which I check is correct.
This is the point now where the Pi storage medium (e.g an SD card) has to be properly destroyed if you ever get rid of it.
I had thought that now would be a good time to decide if your new wallet will generate Segwit receiving addresses, and also addresses used to receive 'change' after a transaction..
But it seems Armory WON'T let you switch to P2SH-P2WPKH unless your Armory is connected to a node offering "WITNESS" service.
Obviously, my Pi is offline and will never connect to a node, so the following will not work on the Pi:
NB: I thought about setting this on the Debian "watch-only" wallet, but that would surely mean doom, as the Pi would not know about those addresses and backups might not keep them.. who knows...
So, end result:- no segwit for me just yet in my offline funds.

--If anyone can offer a solution to this, I'd be very grateful--

Section 3

Ok, now this is a good point to back up your wallet on the Pi. It has your imported keys. I choose a Digital Backup - and put it on a USB key, which will never touch the internet and will be stored off-site. I also chose to encrypt it, because I'm good with passwords..
NB: The Armory paper backup will NOT back up your imported private keys, so keep those somewhere if you're not sweeping them. It would be prudent to have an Armory paper backup anyway, but remember it will likely NOT help you with that imported key.
Now for the watch-only copy of the wallet. I want to get the "watch-only" version onto my Desktop Debian machine.
On the Pi, I created (exported to a USB key) a "watching-only" copy of my wallet.
I would use the RECOMMENDED approach, export the "Entire Wallet File".
As you will see below, I initially exported only the ROOT data, which will NOT capture the watching-only part of the Private Key I entered manually above (i.e. the public Key!).
Now, back on the Debian Desktop machine...
I stopped all my crontab jobs; just give Armory uninterrupted CPU/memory/disk...
I also stopped bitcoind and made a backup prior to any watch-only wallet being imported.
I already made a backup of Armory on my Desktop, before any wallet import.
(this was needed, as I made a mistake.. see below)
So on the Debian Desktop machine, I begin by firing up bitcoind.
my command for this is:
./bitcoind -daemon -datadir=/BlockChain/chain20180414 -dbcache=400 -maxmempool=400 

Section 4

I try running Armory like this:
(I'm actually starting Armory from a script - StartArm.sh)
Inside the script StartArm.sh, it has the line:
python ArmoryQt.py --ram-usage=4 --satoshi-datadir=/BlockChain/chain20180414/blocks --datadir=/ArmoryDataDi --dbdir=/ArmoryDataDidatabases 
I know from bitter experience that doing a scan over the blockchain for a new wallet takes a looong time and a lot of CPU, and I'd like it to play nicely; not gobble all the memory and swap and run my 2xCPUs both at 100% for four hours...
So... I aim to run with --ram-usage=X and --thread-count=X
(For me in the end, X=1 but I began with X=4)
I began with --ram-usage=4 (<--- = 4x128Mb)
The result is below...
TypeError: cannot concatenate 'str' and 'int' objects 
It didn't recognise the ram-usage and carried on, crippling my Debian desktop PC.
This is where it gets dangerous; Armory can gobble so much memory and CPU that the windowing environment can cease up, and it can take over 30 minutes just to exit nicely from bitcoind and ArmoryDB.
So, I ssh to the machine from another computer, and keep an eye on it with the command
"free -h" 
I'd also be able to do a "sudo reboot now" if needed from here.

Section 5

So, trying to get my --ram-usage command recognised, I tried this line (added quotes):
python ArmoryQt.py --ram-usage="4" --satoshi-datadir=/BlockChain/chain20180414/blocks --datadir=/ArmoryDataDi --dbdir=/ArmoryDataDidatabases 
But no, same error...
Loading Armory Engine: Armory Version: 0.96.4 Armory Build: None PyBtcWallet Version: 1.35 Detected Operating system: Linux OS Variant : ('debian', '9.4', '') User home-directory : /home/ Satoshi BTC directory : /BlockChain/chain20180414 Armory home dir : /ArmoryDataDi ArmoryDB directory : /ArmoryDataDidatabases Armory settings file : /ArmoryDataDiArmorySettings.txt Armory log file : /ArmoryDataDiarmorylog.txt Do wallet checking : True (ERROR) ArmoryUtils.py:3723 - Unsupported language specified. Defaulting to English (en) (ERROR) ArmoryQt.py:1833 - Failed to start Armory database: cannot concatenate 'str' and 'int' objects Traceback (most recent call last): File "ArmoryQt.py", line 1808, in startArmoryDBIfNecessary TheSDM.spawnDB(str(ARMORY_HOME_DIR), TheBDM.armoryDBDir) File "/BitcoinArmory/SDM.py", line 387, in spawnDB pargs.append('--ram-usage=' + ARMORY_RAM_USAGE) TypeError: cannot concatenate 'str' and 'int' objects 

Section 6

So, I edit the Armory python file SDM.py:
if ARMORY_RAM_USAGE != -1: pargs.append('--ram-usage=4') #COMMENTED THIS, SO I CAN HARDCODE =4 # ' + ARMORY_RAM_USAGE) 
Running it, I now have acknowledgement of the --ram-usage=4:
(WARNING) SDM.py:400 - Spawning DB with command: /BitcoinArmory/ArmoryDB --db-type="DB_FULL" --cookie --satoshi-datadir="/BlockChain/chain20180414/blocks" --datadir="/ArmoryDataDi" --dbdir="/ArmoryDataDidatabases" --ram-usage=4 
Also, even with ram-usage=4, it used too much memory, so I told it to quit.
It took over 30 minutes to stop semi-nicely. The last thing it reported was:
ERROR - 00:25:21: (StringSockets.cpp:351) FcgiSocket::writeAndRead FcgiError: unexpected fcgi header version 
But that didn't seem to matter or corrupt the Armory Database, so I think it's ok.
So, I get brave and change SDM.py as below, and I make sure my script has a command line for --ram-usage="ABCDE" and --thread-count="FGHIJ"; the logic being that these strings "ABCDE" will pass the IF criteria below, and my hardcoded values will be used...
if ARMORY_RAM_USAGE != -1: pargs.append('--ram-usage=1') #COMMENTED THIS, SO I CAN HARDCODE =1 # ' + ARMORY_RAM_USAGE) if ARMORY_THREAD_COUNT != -1 pargs.append('--thread-count=1') #COMMENTED THIS, SO I CAN HARDCODE =1 #' + ARMORY_THREAD_COUNT) 
So, as usual, I use my script and start this with: ./StartArm.sh
(which uses command line:)
python ArmoryQt.py --ram-usage="ABCDE" --thread-count="FGHIJ" --satoshi-datadir=/BlockChain/chain20180414/blocks --datadir=/ArmoryDataDi --dbdir=/ArmoryDataDidatabases 
(this forces it to use my hard-coded values in SDM.py...)
So, this is the command which it reports that it starts with:
(WARNING) SDM.py:400 - Spawning DB with command: /BitcoinArmory/ArmoryDB --db-type="DB_FULL" --cookie --satoshi-datadir="/BlockChain/chain20180414/blocks" --datadir="/ArmoryDataDi" --dbdir="/ArmoryDataDidatabases" --ram-usage=1 --thread-count=1 
Again, this is where it gets dangerous; Armory can gobble so much memory and CPU that the windowing environment can cease up. So I ssh to the machine and keep an eye on it with:
"free -h" 

Section 7

So, on the Debian Desktop PC, I inserted the USB stick with the watch-only wallet I exported from the Pi.
Start Armory...
Import "Entire Wallet File" watch-only copy.
Wait 4 hours..
YAY!!!
After running Armory for about 30m, the memory usage dropped by 400m... wierd...
It took ~2 hours to get 40% completion.
After 3.5 hours it's almost there...
The memory went up to about 1.7Gb in use and 900Mb of Swap, but the machine remained fairly responsive throughout, apart from a few (10?) periods at the start, where it appeared to freeze for 10-30s at a time.
(That's where my ssh session came in handy - I could check the machine was still ok with a "free -h" command)
Now, I can:
Create an unsigned transaction on my Desktop,
Save the tx to USB stick,
Move to the Pi,
Sign the tx,
Move back to the Desktop,
Broadcast the signed tx.

Section 8

My initial Mistake:
This caused me to have to roll-back my Armory database, using the backup. so you should try to avoid doing this..
On the Pi, I exported only the ROOT data, which will NOT capture the watching-only part of the Private Key
It is RECOMMENDED to use the Digital Export of Entire Wallet File from the Pi when making a watch-only copy. If you just export just the "ROOT data", not the "Entire Wallet File", you'll have problems if you used an imported Private Key in the offline wallet, like I did.
Using the ROOT data text import, after it finished... my balance was zero. So,. I tried a Help->Rescan Balance (Restart Armory, takes 1minute to get back up and running) No Luck. Still zero balance.
So, I try Rescan Databases.. This will take longer. Nah.. no luck.
So, I tried again, thinking it might be to do with the fact that I imported the text "root data" stuff, instead of following the (Recommended) export of watching-wallet file.
So, I used my Armory backup, and wound back the ArmoryDataDi to the point before the install of the (zero balance) wallet. (you should not need to do this, as you will hopefully use the RECOMMENDED approach of exporting the "Entire Wallet File"!)
submitted by fartinator to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Bitcoin wallets are inaccessible for blind people

So I am a fully blind person who uses a screen reader and every bitcoin wallet I have downloaded (Bitcoin QT, Multibit, Armory) are inaccessible to my screenreader.
This is making me very annoyed as I am a bitcoin supporter and I have acquired my own bitcoin I just cant god damn use them with out getting help from someone else. Multibit Is a java based wallet and as such, could have easily been made accessible if the Java accessibility JDk were included from the start. If we want bitcoin to truly be successful, this has to be dealt with. Any ideas outhere in the readit ethos??
Oh and by the way, when I signed up for readit, I had to fill in a visual captia (which I had to get someone to help me) and as if that was not enough, for posting in this readit forum, I have to get someone to help me fill in another visual captia before I submit. I was going to donate some bitcoin to this forum, but obviously that is a little bit hard when I cannot even really access my bitcoins from my wallet. Kind of makes me not wan to donate now.
Does anybody know of a wallet that would be accessible to screenreaders?
yIf there is not one, does any one know a developer that would take some time to build or develop one? I am sure it would not be all that hard if lets say an open source, java based wallet were redeveloped to include the accessibility JDK/API.
Thanks '
Okay I am going to append a couple of comments to this if I can figure it out:
first thanks for the amazing response!
Second, although I have been creeping the Readit Bitcoin forums for a while, I have never actually posted or interacted and have only been a member for a couple of days so I am a bit clueless as to how to engage the forum and I think I actually posted this same post (above) a fewe times by accident (sorry).
So in response to to some of the comments in general, I am a marginally technically capable blind screen reader user, and as such do not mind spending the time to learn anyway that will help me access the bitcoin technology. That being said, part of the reasoning behind making wallets accessible is so that people who are not technically inclined ( blind or not blind) will be able to more readily access Bitcoins and as such, adoption and uptake will be more fricktionless making the technology more appealing. accessibility for the blind and usability for the sighted are two sides of the same coin in that one compliments the other.
in term terms of the braille suggestions, I am interested, however I only started learning braille recently and I am only in grade one as I have been blind for only five years, so I have a ways to go in that regard.
submitted by garmondbozia to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

PSA: Clearing up some misconceptions about full nodes

It's time to clear up some misconceptions floating around about full nodes.
Myth: There are only about 5500 full nodes worldwide
This number comes from this site and it measured by trying to probe every nodes on their open ports.
Problem is, not all nodes actually have open ports that can be probed. Either because they are behind firewalls or because their users have configured them to not listen for connections.
Nobody knows how many full nodes there are, since many people don't know how to forward ports behind a firewall, and bandwidth can be costly, its quite likely that the number of nodes with closed ports is at least another several thousand.
Nodes with open ports are able to upload blocks to new full nodes. In all other ways they are the same as nodes with closed ports. But because open-port-nodes can be measured and closed-port-nodes cannot, some members of the bitcoin community have been mistaken into believing that open-port-nodes are that matters.
Myth: This number of nodes matters and/or is too low.
Nodes with open ports are useful to the bitcoin network because they help bootstrap new nodes by uploading historical blocks, they are a measure of bandwidth capacity. Right now there is no shortage of bandwidth capacity, and if there was it could be easily added by renting cloud servers.
The problem is not bandwidth or connections, but trust, security and privacy. Let me explain.
Full nodes are able to check that all of bitcoin's rules are being followed. Rules like following the inflation schedule, no double spending, no spending of coins that don't belong to the holder of the private key and all the other rules required to make bitcoin work (e.g. difficulty)
Full nodes are what make bitcoin trustless. No longer do you have to trust a financial institution like a bank or paypal, you can simply run software on your own computer. To put simply, the only node that matters is the one you use
Myth: There is no incentive to run nodes, the network relies on altruism
It is very much in the individual bitcoin's users rational self interest to run a full node and use it as their wallet.
Using a full node as your wallet is the only way to know for sure that none of bitcoin's rules have been broken. Rules like no coins were spent not belonging to the owner, that no coins were spent twice, that no inflation happens outside of the schedule and that all the rules needed to make the system work are followed (e.g. difficulty.) All other kinds of wallet involve trusting a third party server.
All these checks done by full nodes also increase the security. There are many attacks possible against lightweight wallets that do not affect full node wallets.
This is not just mindless paranoia, there have been real world examples where full node users were unaffected by turmoil in the rest of the bitcoin ecosystem. The 4th July 2015 accidental chain fork effected many kinds of wallets. Here is the wiki page on this event https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/July_2015_chain_forks#Wallet_Advice
Notice how updated node software was completely unaffected by the fork. All other wallets required either extra confirmations or checking that the third-party institution was running the correct version.
Full nodes wallets are also currently the most private way to use Bitcoin, with nobody else learning which bitcoin addresses belong to you. All other lightweight wallets leak information about which addresses are yours because they must query third-party servers. The Electrum servers will know which addresses belong to you and can link them together. Despite bloom filtering, lightweight wallets based on BitcoinJ do not provide much privacy against nodes who connected directly to the wallet or wiretappers.
For many use cases, such privacy may not be required. But an important reason to run a full node and use it as a wallet is to get the full privacy benefits.
Myth: I can just set up a node on a cloud server instance and leave it
To get the benefits of running a full node, you must use it as your wallet, preferably on hardware you control.
Most people who do this do not use a full node as their wallet. Unfortunately because Bitcoin has a similar name to Bittorrent, some people believe that upload capacity is the most important thing for a healthy network. As I've explained above: bandwidth and connections are not a problem today, trust, security and privacy are.
Myth: Running a full node is not recommended, most people should use a lightweight client
This was common advice in 2012, but since then the full node software has vastly improved in terms of user experience.
If you cannot spare the disk space to store the blockchain, you can enable pruning. In Bitcoin Core 0.12, pruning being enabled will leave the wallet enabled. Altogether this should require less than 900MB of hard disk space.
If you cannot spare the bandwidth to upload blocks to other nodes, there are number of options to reduce or eliminate the bandwidth requirement. These include limiting connections, bandwidth targetting and disabling listening. Bitcoin Core 0.12 has the new option -blocksonly, where the node will not download unconfirmed transaction and only download new blocks. This more than halves the bandwidth usage at the expense of not seeing unconfirmed transactions.
Synchronizing the blockchain for a new node has improved since 2012 too. Features like headers-first and libsecp256k1 have greatly improved the initial synchronization time.
It can be further improved by setting -dbcache=3000 which keeps more of the UTXO set in memory. It reduces the amount of time reading from disk and therefore speeds up synchronization. Tests showed that the entire blockchain can now be synchronized in less than 3 and a half hours (Note that you'll need Bitcoin Core 0.12 or later to get all these efficiency improvements) Another example with 2h 25m
How to run a full node as your wallet.
I think every moderate user of bitcoin would benefit by running a full node and using it as their wallet. There are several ways to do this.
So what are you waiting for? The benefits are many, the downsides are not that bad. The more people do this, the more robust and healthy the bitcoin ecosystem is.
Further reading: http://www.truthcoin.info/blog/measuring-decentralization/
submitted by belcher_ to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Basic Bitcoin security guide

Hello,
This post is to give you a quick introduction into Bitcoin security. While nobody can guarantee you 100% security, I hope to mitigate some problems you can run into. This is the “20% of effort to get you to 80% safe”.
First of all, you have to determine how much money you want to hold in Bitcoin and how much effort are you willing to put in. If you are happy just holding a few dollars worth and don’t care if you lose them, that’s one approach to take. For everyone else, lets get started.
Password strength
A lot of the times how secure your money is will be determined by the strength of your password. Since in the worst case scenario we are talking about someone trying to brute force your wallet, casual online passwords are too weak. Under 10 characters is too weak. Common words and phrases are too weak. Adding one number to a password at the end is too weak.
Moreover, you can consider your password much weaker if you:
If you want a really strong password:
Wallet security
Now we are getting to the meat of things.
There are a number of wallets available to store your hard earned bitcoins. If you have a decent amount of coins to store, you should look into software wallets - BitcoinQT, MultiBit, Armory or Electrum. They are among the best place to store your money safely (provided your computer is secure as well). Chose one you think best suits you, install it and encrypt your wallet file with your strong password. You should take your wallet file and back it up (location of the file is different for different clients, so you have to do some research as to where to find that file). Back it up on a CD, safe USB drive or the like. Keep them safe. If you lose that file, you will lose your money.
A quick word on deterministic wallets. Electrum and Armory allow you to create wallets from a seed. If you use the same seed later, you can recreate your wallet on other machines. With deterministic wallets, you only need to keep that seed secure to have access to your money.
In comparison, in BitcoinQT's traditional wallet, every address you use is random, meaning that after you send 50-100 outgoing transactions your backups can be obsolete. Always keep an up-to-date backup of such wallet file if possible.
Okay, sometimes you need to have your Bitcoins with you when you leave your computer. In this case, you should look into either online or mobile wallets. A staple for both of those is Blockchain.info, but there are others to chose from.
A good rule of thumb with these is to not store more money in them than you can afford to lose. They are best used as a convenient way of accessing some money, not storing your savings. Online wallets are especially vulnerable to their servers getting hacked and people’s money getting stolen.
What to keep in mind while using online wallets:
  • Use a secure password (the more money you have in them the stronger the password should be)
  • Always keep a backup of your wallet in case you need to recover your money
  • Whenever possible, enable two factor authentication
  • Don’t use your online wallets from unsafe computers
Cold storage
Sometimes you want to store your bitcoins for a long time in a safe place. This is called “cold storage”. There are a few ways one can do this.
First of all, paper wallets. They are nice for giving people small bitcoin gifts, but also for long-term storage if properly used. What you want to do is generate and print them offline. You can save the linked page for example and run that offline. If you are really paranoid, you can put it on read-only media and access that from a different computer. For really long term storage, use archival-grade paper.
Another approach to take is using a separate computer for storing your money that is offline 99+% of the time. You could set one up easily by buying an old laptop, reformatting it, installing Linux and a Bitcoin client. Generate an address on that machine and send money to it from your main wallet. Depending on how paranoid you are you can connect that computer to the Internet afterwards to synchronize data with the Bitcoin Network and then turn it off and put it away somewhere safe until it’s needed.
Brain wallets
Don’t. They are not for you. Unless you are a security-conscientious programmer, those are not for you.
Diversifying
Keeping all of your eggs in one basket is never a good thing. You should look into diversifying some of your Bitcoin assets in case your other storage methods fail. Some ways you can diversify:
  • Buy a physical Bitcoin. As long as you trust the coin creator such coins can be an effective cold storage
  • Invest - I wouldn’t recommend this for more than some trivial amount unless you know what you are doing, but investing in some Bitcoin stocks could be a way to get more money out of your bitcoins
How not to diversify:
  • Avoid keeping your bitcoins at exchanges or other online sites that are not your online wallets. Such sites can be closed down or disappear along with your money.
  • Alt-coins - there are few cryptocurrencies that are worthwhile, but most of them are just Bitcoin clones. If a currency brings nothing new, it’s worthless in comparison to Bitcoin. Namecoin is a distributed domain name server (although recently it had a fatal flaw uncovered, so be warned), Ripple is a distributed currency exchange and payment system. Litecoin will only be useful in case Bitcoin’s hashing algorithm gets compromised (very unlikely at this time). Beyond that there are few if any alt-coins that are a worthwhile way of diversifying.
Accepting payments and safety
We’ve covered safe ways to store money, now a quick note about bitcoin payments and their safety.
First of all, when you are sending a transaction, pay your fees. Transactions without fees can take forever to propagate, confirm and clear. This can cause you a lot of stress, so pay your fees.
Secondly, when accepting large Bitcoin payments (say you want to suddenly cash in a gold bar into bitcoins), wait for at the very least 1 confirmation on those transactions. 6 is best, but having even 1 confirmations is a lot better than having none. This is mainly a rule of thumb for the paranoid (I wouldn’t be doing this for most casual transaction), but maybe it will save you if you are dealing with some shady people.
Wrapping up...
That should cover the basics. If you want to read more about Bitcoin’s security in general, here is my master thesis on the subject. A lot of questions about Bitcoin and security have also been answered on Bitcoin StackExchange - be sure to check it out.
Comments and improvement suggestions welcome.
EDITS:
  • Removed link to insecure site
  • Removed random article section
  • Added information about deterministic wallets
submitted by ThePiachu to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

[Reupload][Tutorial] Install Armory Wallet 0.96.4 on Fedora Workstation 29

note: I had to reupload this because reddit is banning my original account for no reason. I appealed but I thought maybe someone wanted to have this content online.
Armory is a very cool open source bitcoin wallet for the power user. You can do neat things with it, read here: https://www.bitcoinarmory.com/
Disclaimer: follow these steps at your own risk. I am not responsible for any damage / loss of funds you might face for following or not following correctly my instructions here. I may have made a typo somewhere or be wrong so do your own research and learn for yourself what I am doing at each step, and what consequences may have for you, at your own risk. These instructions may be wrong somewhere. It worked for me, it doesn't mean it has to work for you.
Requirements for this tutorial:
We are going to build the code from source.
Install dependencies.
I followed these instructions to find the equivalent Fedora packages:
Open the terminal app and run this command:
sudo dnf install git nano qt qt-devel python-devel libtool pyqt4 pyqt4-devel lmdb swig 
And more python packages that I had to install:
sudo pip install twisted qt4reactor psutil 
Importing the signing key to verify the software
Install KGPG to easily manage keys.
sudo dnf install kgpg 
Go to
https://keyserver.ubuntu.com/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x8C5211764922589A
and copy paste the code below the title from
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
to
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
both included. Then open KGPG from terminal with
kgpg -k 
and click 'Import Key...' > Clipboard > Ok . You should see a confirmation message. Double check the info and close the dialog.
Repeat the process with this other key:
https://keyserver.ubuntu.com/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xA4FC919E85C595BA
You can verify both keys are mentioned at the Armory webpage.
Clone and compile the code plus some edits
Before, we installed some dependencies that are named differently than the equivalent Ubuntu/Debian package specified at the Armory documentation. The build process fails for Fedora as the name for the dependency during checks won't match the Fedora version. There's this pull request addressing that, but the code is not part of any release yet.
So the fastest workaround (maybe a bit dirty) was to edit the build config file and correct the name for my Fedora install. Let's begin.
Clone the Armory repository
git clone https://github.com/goatpig/BitcoinArmory.git 
Enter the BitcoinArmory dir
cd BitcoinArmory 
Switch to release code
git checkout 'v0.96.4' 
Verify commit signature
git tag -v 'v0.96.4' 
you should see the following message:
> object fee1f91a3137ef1056e15cc606a186b0e508f84c > type commit > tag v0.96.4 > tagger goatpig  1522530739 +0200 > > v0.96.4 > gpg: Signature made Sat 31 Mar 2018 11:12:19 PM CEST > gpg: using RSA key 8C5211764922589A > gpg: Good signature from "goatpig (Offline signing key for Armory releases) " > gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature! > gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner. > Primary key fingerprint: 745D 707F BA53 968B DF63 AA8D 8C52 1176 4922 589A 
if it looks the same, everything is ok.
Edit the file 'Makefile' file with
gedit Makefile 
And click the three dot menu > Find and Replace...
Configure the options as follows:
https://i.imgur.com/hpS01Kd.png
Click Replace All and close.
Go back to the terminal and run the following commands in order from inside the BitcoinArmory dir. Wait for the previous one to finish before running the next one:
./autogen.sh 
...
./configure 
...
make 
if everything finishes without error you are all done! Run this to start Armory:
python ./ArmoryQt.py 
you are all set. Please let me know if I missed something.
submitted by RedditShadowbangedMe to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Dave Bitcoin of walletrecoveryservices.com just cracked a wallet for me (whose passphrase I lost in May).

Background:
In May I got the "brilliant" idea of beefing up the security of my BitcoinQT wallet by replacing its password with a longer passphrase. Somehow I managed to mistype the passphase twice. I tried every thing I could think of (adding spaces, inverting capitalization, etc. etc.) but without success, even automating the guesses with a simple script from someone on bitcointalk.
Eventually I wrote the coins off and my next wallet passphrase was typed with extreme caution. (Plus I switched to using Armory where the paper backup feature is a nice safety valve.) I gave the wallet.dat file to a few people who contacted me via the bitcointalk forums, and thought that was the end of it.
So last night, I'm obsessively watching the BTC-CNY exchange rate like everyone else, when I get an email from one "Dave Bitcoin" who announced that he had cracked the passphrase (after more than 5 months!). In short order he sent me 2.0 of the original 2.5 BTC in the wallet (keeping a finder's fee we had agreed to when I originally sent him the wallet file, not that I was in a particularly good bargaining position).
It was a very pleasant surprise that he (a) was able to crack the wallet, and (b) was honest enough to return the coins. He mentioned in the email that part of his motivation for (b) is that he has started a business doing wallet recovery. I figure the least I can do is vouch for his competence and integrity. So all you morons out there who lost a wallet like me, consider using Dave's services at http://walletrecoveryservices.com/.
submitted by sflicht to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

TIL why Newbies still download the Bitcoin-QT client!

Because we told them to. Newbies don't start with reddit or bitcoinforums (unless they are redditors, of course). They start with what looks like an authoritative source. (And journalists do the same.) Let's have a look.
Bitcoin.org has a list of wallets and recommends two good options at the top, MultiBit or Schildbach, but if you take a look at the bottom, it prominently lists: Bitcoin-QT and Armory (which requires Bitcoin-QT/bitcoind). This is fine, I suppose, but it explains the popularity of Bitcoin-QT since most alternatives come with warnings.
weusecoins, a website that is prominently featured as a first stop for newbies, sends users dierectly to Bitcoin-QT, without any explanation or alternatives.
Bitcoin Wiki same same
This guarantees some bad user experience. Can we fix it? Who edits weusecoins.com and bitcoin.it?
submitted by arbeitslos to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

[Tutorial] Install Armory Wallet 0.96.4 on Fedora Workstation 29

Armory is a very cool open source bitcoin wallet for the power user. You can do neat things with it, read here: https://www.bitcoinarmory.com/
Disclaimer: follow these steps at your own risk. I am not responsible for any damage / loss of funds you might face for following or not following correctly my instructions here. I may have made a typo somewhere or be wrong so do your own research and learn for yourself what I am doing at each step, and what consequences may have for you, at your own risk. These instructions may be wrong somewhere. It worked for me, it doesn't mean it has to work for you.
Requirements for this tutorial:
We are going to build the code from source.
Install dependencies.
I followed these instructions to find the equivalent Fedora packages:
Open the terminal app and run this command:
sudo dnf install git nano qt qt-devel python-devel libtool pyqt4 pyqt4-devel lmdb swig 
And more python packages that I had to install:
sudo pip install twisted qt4reactor psutil 
Importing the signing key to verify the software
Install KGPG to easily manage keys.
sudo dnf install kgpg 
Go to
https://keyserver.ubuntu.com/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x8C5211764922589A
and copy paste the code below the title from
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
to
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
both included. Then open KGPG from terminal with
kgpg -k 
and click 'Import Key...' > Clipboard > Ok . You should see a confirmation message. Double check the info and close the dialog.
Repeat the process with this other key:
https://keyserver.ubuntu.com/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xA4FC919E85C595BA
You can verify both keys are mentioned at the Armory webpage.
Clone and compile the code plus some edits
Before, we installed some dependencies that are named differently than the equivalent Ubuntu/Debian package specified at the Armory documentation. The build process fails for Fedora as the name for the dependency during checks won't match the Fedora version. There's this pull request addressing that, but the code is not part of any release yet.
So the fastest workaround (maybe a bit dirty) was to edit the build config file and correct the name for my Fedora install. Let's begin.
Clone the Armory repository
git clone https://github.com/goatpig/BitcoinArmory.git 
Enter the BitcoinArmory dir
cd BitcoinArmory 
Switch to release code
git checkout 'v0.96.4' 
Verify commit signature
git tag -v 'v0.96.4' 
you should see the following message:
> object fee1f91a3137ef1056e15cc606a186b0e508f84c > type commit > tag v0.96.4 > tagger goatpig  1522530739 +0200 > > v0.96.4 > gpg: Signature made Sat 31 Mar 2018 11:12:19 PM CEST > gpg: using RSA key 8C5211764922589A > gpg: Good signature from "goatpig (Offline signing key for Armory releases) " > gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature! > gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner. > Primary key fingerprint: 745D 707F BA53 968B DF63 AA8D 8C52 1176 4922 589A 
if it looks the same, everything is ok.
Edit the file 'Makefile' file with
gedit Makefile 
And click the three dot menu > Find and Replace...
Configure the options as follows:
https://i.imgur.com/hpS01Kd.png
Click Replace All and close.
Go back to the terminal and run the following commands in order from inside the BitcoinArmory dir. Wait for the previous one to finish before running the next one:
./autogen.sh 
...
./configure 
...
make 
if everything finishes without error you are all done! Run this to start Armory:
python ./ArmoryQt.py 
you are all set. Please let me know if I missed something.
edit: cd git dir.
submitted by AmbitiousSpeed0 to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Secure paper wallet tutorial

This is my handout for paranoid people who want a way to store bitcoin safely. It requires a little work, but this is the method I use because it should be resistant to risks associated with:
  1. Bad random number generators
  2. Malicious or flawed software
  3. Hacked computers
If you want a method that is less secure but easier, skip to the bottom of this post.
The Secure Method
  1. Download bitaddress.org. (Try going to the website and pressing "ctrl+s")
  2. Put the bitaddress.org file on a computer with an operating system that has not interacted with the internet much or at all. The computer should not be hooked up to the internet when you do this. You could put the bitaddress file on a USB stick, and then turn off your computer, unplug the internet, and boot it up using a boot-from-CD copy of linux (Ubuntu or Mint for example). This prevents any mal-ware you may have accumulated from running and capturing your keystrokes. I use an old android smart phone that I have done a factory reset on. It has no sim-card and does not have the password to my home wifi. Also the phone wifi is turned off. If you are using a fresh operating system, and do not have a connection to the internet, then your private key will probably not escape the computer.
  3. Roll a die 62 times and write down the sequence of numbers. This gives you 2160 possible outcomes, which is the maximum that Bitcoin supports.
  4. Run bitaddress.org from your offline computer. Input the sequence of numbers from the die rolls into the "Brain Wallet" tab. By providing your own source of randomness, you do not have to worry that the random number generator used by your computer is too weak. I'm looking at you, NSA ಠ_ಠ
  5. Brain Wallet tab creates a private key and address.
  6. Write down the address and private key by hand or print them on a dumb printer. (Dumb printer means not the one at your office with the hard drive. Maybe not the 4 in 1 printer that scans and faxes and makes waffles.) If you hand copy them you may want to hand copy more than one format. (WIF and HEX). If you are crazy and are storing your life savings in Bitcoin, and you hand copy the private key, do a double-check by typing the private key back into the tool on the "Wallet Details" tab and confirm that it recreates the same public address.
  7. Load your paper wallet by sending your bitcoin to the public address. You can do this as many times as you like.
  8. You can view the current balance of your paper wallet by typing the public address into the search box at blockchain.info
  9. If you are using an old cell phone or tablet do a factory reset when you are finished so that the memory of the private keys is destroyed. If you are using a computer with a boot-from-CD copy of linux, I think you can just power down the computer and the private keys will be gone. (Maybe someone can confirm for me that the private keys would not be able to be cached by bitaddress?)
  10. To spend your paper wallet, you will need to either create an offline transaction, or import the private key into a hot wallet. Creating an offline transaction is dangerous if you don't know what you are doing. Importing to a client side wallet like Bitcoin-Qt, Electrum, MultiBit or Armory is a good idea. You can also import to an online wallet such as Blockchain.info or Coinbase.
Trusting bitaddress.org
The only thing you need bitaddress.org to do is to honestly convert the brainwallet passphrase into the corresponding private key and address. You can verify that it is doing this honestly by running several test passphrases through the copy of bitaddress that you plan on using, and several other brainwallet generators. For example, you could use the online version of bitaddress, and brainwallet and safepaperwallet and bitcoinpaperwallet. If you are fancy with the linux command line, you can also try "echo -n my_die_rolls | sha256sum". The linux operating system should reply with the same private key that bitaddress makes. This protects you from a malicious paper wallet generator.
Trusting your copy of bitaddress.org
Bitaddress publishes the sha1 hash of the bitaddress.org website at this location:
https://www.bitaddress.org/pgpsignedmsg.txt
The message is signed by the creator, pointbiz. I found his PGP fingerprint here:
https://github.com/pointbiz/bitaddress.org/issues/18
"527B 5C82 B1F6 B2DB 72A0 ECBF 8749 7B91 6397 4F5A"
With this fingerprint, you can authenticate the signed message, which gives you the hash of the current bitaddress.org file. Then you can hash your copy of the file and authenticate the file.
I do not have a way to authenticate the fingerprint itself, sorry. According to the website I linked to, git has cryptographic traceability that would enable a person to do some research and authenticate the fingerprint. If you want to go that far, knock yourself out. I think that the techniques described in this document do not really rely on bitaddress being un-corrupt. Anyway, how do we know pointbiz is a good guy? ;-)
There are a lot of skilled eyes watching bitaddress.org and the signed sha1 hash. To gain the most benefit from all of those eyes, it's probably worthwhile to check your copy by hashing it and comparing to the published hash.
"But we aren't supposed to use brainwallets"
You are not supposed to use brainwallets that have predictable passphrases. People think they are pretty clever about how they pick their passphrases, but a lot of bitcoins have been stolen because people tend to come up with similar ideas. If you let dice generate the passphrase, then it is totally random, and you just need to make sure to roll enough times.
How to avoid spending your life rolling dice
When I first started doing this, I rolled a die 62 times for each private key. This is not necessary. You can simply roll the die 62 times and keep the sequence of 62 numbers as a "seed". The first paper address you create would use "my die rolls-1" as the passphrase, the second would be "my die rolls-2" and so on. This is safe because SHA256 prevents any computable relationship between the resulting private key family.
Of course this has a certain bad security scenario -- if anyone obtains the seed they can reconstruct all of your paper wallets. So this is not for everyone! On the other hand, it also means that if you happen to lose one of your paper wallets, you could reconstruct it so long as you still had the seed.
One way to reduce this risk is to add an easy to remember password like this: "my die rolls-password-1".
If you prefer, you can use a technique called diceware to convert your die rolls to words that still contain the same quantity of entropy, but which could be easier to work with. I don't use diceware because it's another piece of software that I have to trust, and I'm just copy/pasting my high entropy seed, so I don't care about how ugly it is.
Why not input the dice as a Base 6 private key on the Wallet Details tab?
Two reasons. First of all, this option requires that you roll the die 99 times, but you do not get meaningful additional protection by rolling more than 62 times. Why roll more times if you don't have to? Second, I use the "high entropy seed" method to generate multiple private keys from the same die rolls. Using the Base 6 option would require rolling 99 times for every private key.
I'm a big nerd with exotic dice. How many times to roll?
Put this formula in Excel to get the number of times to roll: "=160*LOG(2,f)" where f = number of faces on the die. For example, you would roll a d16 40 times. By the way, somewhat unbelievably casino dice are more fair than ordinary dice
The "Change address" problem:
You should understand change addresses because some people have accidentally lost money by not understanding it.
Imagine your paper wallet is a 10 dollar bill. You use it to buy a candy bar. To do this you give the cashier the entire 10 dollar bill. They keep 1 dollar and give you 9 dollars back as change.
With Bitcoin, you have to explicitly say that you want 9 dollars back, and you have to provide an address where it should go to. If you just hand over the 10 dollar bill, and don't say you want 9 dollars back, then the miner who processes the transaction gives 1 dollar to the store and keeps the remainder themselves.
Wallet software like Bitcoin-Qt handles this automatically for you. They automatically make "change addresses" and they automatically construct transactions that make the change go to the change address.
There are three ways I know of that the change problem can bite you:
  1. You generate a raw transaction by hand, and screw up. If you are generating a transaction "by hand" with a raw transaction editor, you need to be extra careful that your outputs add up to the same number as your inputs. Otherwise, the very lucky miner who puts your transaction in a block will keep the difference.
  2. You import a paper wallet into a wallet software and spend part of it, and then think that the change is in the paper wallet. The change is not in the paper wallet. It is in a change address that the wallet software generated. That means that if you lose your wallet.dat file you will lose all the change. The paper wallet is empty.
  3. You import a paper wallet into a wallet software and spend part of it, and then think that the change is in the change address that the wallet software generated. If the transaction did not need to consume all of the "outputs" used to fund the paper wallet, then there could be some unspent outputs still located at the address of the paper wallet. If you destroyed the paper wallet, and destroyed the copy of the private key imported to the wallet software, then you could not access this money. (E.g. if you restored the software wallet from its seed, thinking all of the money was moved to the wallet-generated change addresses.)
For more on this, see here
The hot paper wallet problem
Your bitcoin in your paper wallet are secure, so long as the piece of paper is secure, until you go to spend it. When you spend it, you put the private key onto a computer that is connected to the internet. At this point you must regard your paper wallet address as hot because the computer you used may have been compromised. It now provides much less protection against theft of your coins. If you need the level of protection that a cold paper wallet provides, you need to create a new one and send your coins to it.
Destroying your paper wallet address
Do not destroy the only copy of a private key without verifying that there is no money at that address. Your client may have sent change to your paper wallet address without you realizing it. Your client may have not consumed all of the unspent outputs available at the paper wallet address. You can go to blockchain.info and type the public address into the search window to see the current balance. I don't bother destroying my used/empty paper wallet addresses. I just file them away.
Encrypting your private key
BIP 0038 describes a standardized way to encrypt your paper wallet private key. A normal paper wallet is vulnerable because if anyone sees the private key they can take the coins. The BIP38 protocol is even resistant to brute force attacks because it uses a memory intensive encryption algorithm called scrypt. If you want to encrypt your wallets using BIP38, I recommend that you use bitcoinpaperwallet because they will let you type in your own private key and will encrypt it for you. As with bitaddress, for high security you should only use a local copy of this website on a computer that will never get connected to the internet.
Splitting your private key
Another option for protecting the private key is to convert it into multiple fragments that must be brought together. This method allows you to store pieces of your key with separate people in separate locations. It can be set up so that you can reconstitute the private key when you have any 2 out of the 3 fragments. This technique is called Shamir's Secret Sharing. I have not tried this technique, but you may find it valuable. You could try using this website http://passguardian.com/ which will help you split up a key. As before, you should do this on an offline computer. Keep in mind if you use this service that you are trusting it to work properly. It would be good to find other independently created tools that could be used to validate the operation of passguardian. Personally, I would be nervous destroying the only copy of a private key and relying entirely on the fragments generated by the website.
Looks like Bitaddress has an implementation of Shamir's Secret Sharing now under the "Split Wallet" tab. However it would appear that you cannot provide your own key for this, so you would have to trust bitaddress.
Durable Media
Pay attention to the media you use to record your paper wallet. Some kinds of ink fade, some kinds of paper disintegrate. Moisture and heat are your enemies.
In addition to keeping copies of my paper wallet addresses I did the following:
  1. Order a set of numeric metal stamps. ($10)
  2. Buy a square galvanized steel outlet cover from the hardware store ($1)
  3. Buy a sledgehammer from the hardware store
  4. Write the die rolls on the steel plate using a sharpie
  5. Use the hammer to stamp the metal. Do all the 1's, then all the 2's etc. Please use eye protection, as metal stamp may emit sparks or fly unexpectedly across the garage. :-)
  6. Use nail polish remover to erase the sharpie
Electrum
If you trust electrum you might try running it on an offline computer, and having it generate a series of private keys from a seed. I don't have experience with this software, but it sounds like there are some slick possibilities there that could save you time if you are working with a lot of addresses.
Message to the downvoters
I would appreciate it if you would comment, so that I can learn from your opinion. Thanks!
The Easy Method
This method is probably suitable for small quantities of bitcoin. I would not trust it for life-altering sums of money.
  1. Download the bitaddress.org website to your hard drive.
  2. Close your browser
  3. Disconnect from the internet
  4. Open the bitaddress.org website from your hard drive.
  5. Print a paper wallet on your printer
  6. Close your browser
submitted by moral_agent to BitcoinWallet [link] [comments]

Has anyone been able to export private keys from Armory?

Hi everyone,
I am super pissed but I am going to try and keep it low key. I have a wallet that I saved in Armory years ago, and I want to move coins from it now. I had looked online a few months ago, and it said that I could export the private keys from Armory and sweep them into Electrum.
Well, today I tried it in both Armory 1.35 on Windows and the latest version on Linux. It doesn't work at all.
You can open a window after choosing to backup individual keys, and there are checkboxes there for all the different types of keys you could want, but checking and unchecking them DOES NOTHING.
All you can get is the Armory backup string for the wallet. That you already have, if you have restored the wallet from a paper backup.
Time to download all 120Gb of the blockchain I guess. Has anyone ever exported private keys from Armory? Am I doing something wrong?
Thanks.
Edit: PSA: Armory does not work at all on a fresh Ubuntu 17 install. It just fails silently and doesn't install. Neither does it work on MacOS El Capitan. On Debian 8, not all of the dependencies are installed properly during installation. I'm afraid to update my Windows copy now.
Edit: Bit the bullet and did it. Got it working on Ubuntu and found out that you have to start bitcoind in the background and play with some Armory settings to get it to run, then downloaded the whole thing from bitcoin-qt. Turns out I was right - Armory doesn't know the private keys until after it has downloaded the whole blockchain. And spent an hour chewing through transactions. AND you've restarted it twice. But I finally got them. Thanks everyone!
submitted by nkvjhi76897yeriu32gr to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Armory Wallet With 2BTC Gone After 3 Years! HELP!

I purchased 2 bitcoins with CoinBase online 3 years ago. I then sent them to an Armory wallet that I had on a server. Everything transferred successfully and I never thought twice about them disappearing. I have a paper back and an encrypted Armory backup of my wallet. I never made any further transactions.
I finally want to access my BTC in my Armory wallet. I started Armory and the program seemed to freeze many times without loading the block chain. I removed Armory and BitCoin-QT (now BitCoin Core). I installed the newest versions of both programs, downloaded the full block chain and restored my wallet using both the paper backup and the encrypted backup.
The balance of the wallet seems to be 0BTC no matter what backup I use. What happened to my 2BTC and how do I go about getting them back. I have full backup images of the server (c drive and d drive) before removing and reinstalling the software, if that helps.
I just can't seem to figure out where the heck my 2BTC went! Please help!
Here are all the details I could find.
My wallet after using my paper restore has the following two address.
submitted by Waterboy550 to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

WARNING: A fake electrum website with malware is advertising on duckduckgo and yahoo.

If you perform a search for electrum on duckduckgo or yahoo, an ad claiming to be electrum.org will be at the top.
In reality the ad links to: electrum-bitcoin org
The domain was created December 21.
This site is nearly identical to electrum.org except the download links give different files. All three of the files that can be download are much smaller than the real electrum and are most likely malware. The three files are: electrum.exe - 91136 bytes electrum.out - 60316 bytes electrum.zip - 32478 bytes
EDIT: Some Advice:
When installing software, especially something as import as wallet software, it is a good idea to verify the integrity of the download with a signature using a key that was obtained from one or more seperate sources.
I made a list of the keys used to sign popular bitcoin wallets below to act as another source to verify the integrity of those keys.
Bitcoin-Qt: Signer: Gavin Andresen [email protected] Fingerprint: 2664 6D99 CBAE C9B8 1982 EF60 29D9 EE6B 1FC7 30C1 Key ID: 1FC730C1 Key Link: bitcoin.org/gavinandresen.asc
Electrum: Signer: ThomasV [email protected] Fingerprint: 6694 D8DE 7BE8 EE56 31BE D950 2BD5 824B 7F94 70E6 Key ID: 7F9470E6 Keyserver: pool.sks-keyservers.net
Multibit: Signer: Jim Burton (multibit.org developer) [email protected] Fingerprint: 299C 423C 672F 47F4 756A 6BA4 C197 2AED 79F7 C572 Key ID: 79F7C572 Keyserver: pgp.mit.edu
Armory: Signer: Alan C. Reiner (Offline Signing Key) [email protected] Fingerprint: 821F 1229 36BD D565 366A C36A 4AB1 6AEA 9883 2223 Key ID: 98832223 Keyserver: pgp.mit.edu
The signatures provided for some of the wallets are signatures of the hash values, so be sure to verify that the hash of the downloaded file matches the hash that was signed.
EDIT: GPG Examples:
Verifying Bitcoin-Qt:
First download, import and check Gavin's key:
Download his key at bitcoin.org/gavinandresen.asc
In terminal or command line run:
gpg --import gavinandresen.asc gpg --fingerprint 
Check that the fingerprint for Gavin's key matches 01CD F462 7A3B 88AA E4A5 71C8 7588 242F BE38 D3A8.
Then download the wallet software and signature.
Verify the signature:
gpg --verify SHA256SUMS.asc 
You should see:
gpg: Good signature from "Gavin Andresen (CODE SIGNING KEY) " 
The signature for Bitcoin-Qt signs the hash values. So we must compute the hash of the downloaded software. This example is using the linux version.
gpg --print-md SHA256 bitcoin-0.8.6-linux.tar.gz 
Check that the output matches the associated hash value in SHA256SUMS.asc
Verifying Electrum:
First download, import and check ThomasV's key:
This key can be found at a keyserver.
gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 7F9470E6 gpg --fingerprint 
Check the fingerprint.
Download Electrum and the signature.
Verify the signature:
gpg --verify Electrum-1.9.6.zip.asc 
You should see:
gpg: Good signature from "ThomasV " 
For this example you do not need to compute any hash values because the signature is signing the downloaded file directly.
submitted by dcc4e to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Armory Wallet Has Failed Me! Can I recover BTC?

So I opted to migrate from coinbase to a local wallet.
Naturally, I download Armory and shoot it a send for 1BTC. 225 confirmations on the SEND, but wallet never receives it.
Turns out, running Armory wallet has been corrupting my database. Every time I run it a background process it spawns causes Bitcoin-QT to fail.
I've tried uninstalling and re-installing bitcoin, armory wallet three times. I've deleted my bitcoin directory in %appdata%, ensured downloads are never interrupted.
Is there any way at all for me to recover the BitCoin I sent to armory wallet provided I can never get armory wallet to work correctly?
Any help appreciated. Here is the errors:
2015-08-21 14:48:15 init message: Activating best chain... 2015-08-21 14:49:23 Corruption: block checksum mismatch 2015-08-21 14:49:23 *** System error while flushing: Database corrupted
submitted by andhof-mt to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Let's Decentralise the World and Make World Crypto Network a Distributed Autonomous Organisation

Decentralise the World

EDIT 2014-08-01 See also pierebel0 Seed the Chain
Please read this carefully and be forthcoming with your views. It’s important to the future of World Crypto Network.
As many of you may know pierebel0 (Nick) and I have been working on an idea and since then we have been putting together diagrams and a plan.
Basically we want to get open source software to regions of the world that have poor internet connectivity and are in need of most financial innovation. This would be like an airdrop of items including:
Nick's initial idea was to produce a list of villages and towns ranked by bandwidth and we would then give each place a Bitcoin donation address.
We could use a map of the world using the open source CoinMap. A page on the World Crypto Net website called Join the Revolution. Members of the audience, hosts of the show and any willing participants in the global campaign can sign up and put themselves on the map.
We could then setup a Bitcoin Wallet in Armory and assign a Bitcoin address for every viable village and town in the world.
Our audience will be invited to vote on which town or village they wanted as to do an Open Source Airdrop on by sending bitcoins to that address. Each donation would be like a vote. We would set targets on each location based on the most cost effective way of delivering it and then let the market decide what order we should go in. We would probably want to weight it to regions that had the most potential to benefit from the project.

World Crypto Network as a DAO (Distributed Autonomous Organisation)

Now the next question that came up is how to handle the funds responsibly?
Up until now people have just trusted Thom and I and sent us money. But if we are going to practice what we preach in this brave new community then what better opportunity to try out a DAO. Recently I reinstalled Bitcoin Armory to try out the new Multisig and multipart paper backup features and I suggest the following process for discussion:
  1. Live Town Hall meeting on Youtube with plenty of advance warning with members of our audience who have followed us up until now to discuss the election process of 7 people who will be custodians of Bitcoin Armory Wallet.
Key decisions will be things like: * How the election should take place? * Using the block chain as a clock on which Bitcoin Block should it commence? e.g. the election takes place at block height #312,020
Once elected each person is given a number at random.
  1. A custodian of the funds is selected at random using the first number in the Bitcoin nonce at block #312,017 between 1 and 7. This way none of the elected 7 will know if they are going to be in charge. This should filter out any power hungry psychopaths as mostly they want control right now and not leave it to chance. We want any would be dictator to self-deselect themselves from this process.
  2. That custodian then produces an Armory wallet consisting of a 5 of 7 paper backup. Each elected member is given one each and the custodian keeps the master copy. In order for the wallet to be restored and funds to be spendable you would need 5 people out of the seven to collude or join together in protest against the custodian.
Everyone, the audience and elected 7 included are encouraged to publish their raw public keys (in hex, not the normal address) so that we can create ad hoc multi-sig wallets with one another on a project by project basis.
I would also like to include the ability for the audience to become hosts and participants and even allow them to seize the funds by co-operating with members of the elected 7. This would mean dividing up 1 of the 7 root keys in to smaller junks like with a multiple encrypted zip file or something.

Thoughts and things to consider:

What I particularly like about splitting up the keys is that we could even engineer it to make sure that no more than 2 members of staff are elected per country. That way no single authority could shut down the World Crypto Network.
It’s also important to note that the elected staff and random custodian are just admin staff. Everyone’s a leader at WCN and the role of the people at the top is to give the people at the bottom everything they need to get their job done. All the custodian is doing it making sure the web hosting is paid for and that the donations get sent to the right people.
Individuals within the organisation are still responsible for their own projects and fundraising. None of the elected 7 can stop you from soliciting money for your hard work. But they might come in handy if you want to set up a project for a 3rd party like Let’s get Nepal on a Meshnet and you would like to setup a 2 of 3 multisig wallet of which one of them could be the custodian. This would lend you credibility when you market your project and make people more likely to donate.
We could also not bother with the initial election and just self appoint the first 7 people and just rotate the duties every 15,000 blocks.
Also Thornbreaker (Jamie Nelson) mentioned that we should come up with a manifesto. I think this is a good idea and we could do it on Github or a Wiki.
Thank-you for your time, I look forward to your reading thoughts.
submitted by MrChrisJ to worldcryptonetwork [link] [comments]

Bitcoin Wallets are not accessible for blind people

So I am a fully blind person who uses a screen reader and every bitcoin wallet I have downloaded (Bitcoin QT, Multibit, Armory) are inaccessible to my screenreader.
This is making me very annoyed as I am a bitcoin supporter and I have acquired my own bitcoin I just cant god damn use them with out getting help from someone else. Multibit Is a java based wallet and as such, could have easily been made accessible if the Java accessibility JDk were included from the start of development. If we want bitcoin to truly be successful, this has to be dealt with. Any ideas outhere in the readit ethos??
Oh and by the way, when I signed up for readit, I had to fill in a visual captia (which I had to get someone to help me) and as if that was not enough, for posting in this readit forum, I have to get someone to help me fill in another visual captia before I submit. I was going to donate some bitcoin to this forum, but obviously that is a little bit hard when I cannot even really access my bitcoins from my wallet or even read the captias. Kind of makes me not wan to donate now.
Does anybody know of a wallet that would be accessible to screenreaders?
If there is not one, does any one know a developer that would take some time to build or develop one? I am sure it would not be all that hard if lets say an open source, java based wallet were redeveloped to include the accessibility JDK/API.
Thanks
submitted by garmondbozia to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

I just saw this one and had a doubt, does wallet leaks my IP? Does vpn requires special config for wallet?

Avoid Thin Clients and Hosted Wallets
Almost all thin clients leak which addresses you own to whatever Simple Payment Verification (SPV) server they connect to. Thin clients do not store the blockchain locally. Instead, they query a single SPV server for the transactions that involve the addresses in your wallet. While this functionality is far more efficient and fast than parsing the blockchain locally, the trade-off is that every Bitcoin address you own is submitted to the SPV server.
Some thin clients, such as Multibit, have the capability of using bloom filters to help conceal which addresses you own by requesting extra transactions that don’t involve your wallet. However, Multibit currently favors efficiency over privacy and does not utilize bloom filters for address anonymization. The Electrum thin client doesn’t use bloom filters at all, so just like Multibit, any server you connect to knows every address that you own.
Hosted clients are even worse in terms of anonymity. All of your private and public keys reside on 3rd party servers, so it is trivial for the operator to know which Bitcoin addresses you own. Additionally, any other information you’ve submitted to the service is associated with your Bitcoin addresses and can be easily accessed by the service’s operators.
These types of wallets make it easy for a SPV server operator or service administrator to not only know which Bitcoin addresses you own, but also associate them with your IP address. The operator could potentially publish the information, they could be hacked and the info stolen, or they could be subpoenaed or NSL’d to provide logs to law enforcement or government agencies.
One of the fundamentals of Bitcoin is not having to trust any single party. In terms of anonymity, it’s best to use a full Bitcoin client like Bitcoin-Qt or Armory, and store the entire blockchain locally.
tl;dr; Thin clients and hosted wallets leak which addresses you own — use a full client like Bitcoin-Qt or Armory instead.
source: https://99bitcoins.com/know-more-using-bitcoin-anonymously/
submitted by Ruban28 to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Help me recover my bitcoins from my wallet backups.

Hey guys.
The history: In 2013 or 2014 I bought 1 BTC and I stored it in one wallet (don't remember which). I have a wallet.dat in my PC and an Armory wallet backup on pdf (paper).
The Armory Backup was encrypted and now I can't see public addresses, but AFAIK this shouldn't be an issue because the backup was done later than the last transfer. How can I know if there are bitcoins in the paper wallet? I've had lots of problems with Armory and can't manage to sync the blockchain.
On the otherhand I have a HDD from that era with Bitcoin QT installed and a wallet.dat there. The thing is that I can't access that wallet and I don't know if the funds are there. How can I tell if there are BTCs there?
I checked the last public key used and still it has the money in it (checked n blockchain.info)
The last option is that I transferred that 1 BTC to other wallet that I lost and never backed-up, but I think this is very unlikely.
Is there anything I can do to find my missing bitcoins?
submitted by pedrots1987 to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Bitcoin Live USB Linux Distribution

I'm throwing together a USB Linux distribution that includes essential tools for bitcoin-related tasks.
My current list of tools is as follows:
Any suggestions?
EDIT: Formatting
EDIT 2: An up-to-date list can be found on github
submitted by zdwolfe1 to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Anyone manage to get Armory working?

I've been trying to get Bitcoin Armory to work. It seems I have a very common problem with the software. 'Initializing Bitcoin Engine' for eternity.
I've done usual 'google it' but those solutions seem to have no effect on armory itself.
For a short while, Bitcoin Core largely had the same issue, by running the 'qt' executable and waiting about an hour; Core is working just fine, and starts up with no issues.
Meanwhile Bitcoin Armory just 'initializes' I do realize I could just use Core, but Armory seemed like it would be pretty damn nice if it actually worked.
And after reading on how wallets work and private keys, etc. I decided the best combo would be a local software-based 'hot/active' wallet and I've got a trezor and trezor steel on the way to cold storage/recovery
Other than running Testnet/qt, is anyone aware of other solutions that worked? My next step is a reinstall.
I don't currently have any wallets or whatnot to worry about. I just spent the past few weeks reading about Bitcoin so I'd actually have an understanding of what I was doing.
I also tried to register over at Bitcoin Talk but their captcha system is broken (shows the same image, but the puzzle is actually different) but that's their issue to resolve.
Anyway, hope you're all having a good day. This cryptocurrency stuff seems pretty cool and I'm looking forward to hopping onto the train.
submitted by Alpha17x to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Beginner's guide: Installing Bitcoin Armory on Windows 7 Bitcoin Armory-Getting Started[HD] Receiving Bitcoin - Armory Guide Bitcoin Armory Setup DIY Bitcoin Armory Hardware Wallet (Teaser)

The biggest pain point of using Bitcoin-Qt (Bitcoin Core) prior to v 0.10 as your wallet is it takes forever to sync to get the complete block chain. A fully functioning node must have the Bitcoin-Qt (Bitcoin Core) client on a machine instance with the complete block chain.Note that this speed-up tip will no longer be necessary for Bitcoin Core version 0.10 (click here for Bitcoin Core version Armory Armory is an advanced Bitcoin client that expands its features for Bitcoin power users. It offers many backup and encryption features, and it allows secure cold-storage on offline computers. Bitcoin-Qt is the so – called" official " client of the network, which is developed and promoted by Bitcoin Foundation, a non-profit organization uniting core developers and responsible for the community's contacts with corporations and governments.Bitcoin Foundation branches are opened in several dozens of countries around the world. Bitcoin ledger bitcoin armory bitcoin qt gold markthändler leipzig download Das Prinzip von Dark Wallet ist in der Tat clever, die Entwickler haben es nämlich geschafft, im Bitcoin System selbst einen neuen Weg der anonymen Zahlungen zu beschreiten. Is full of impersonation.Armory is a great base for building Bitcoin apps like exchanges and Thanks for the info but I'm just gonna transfer the money. I'm not happy with Armory for the following reasons: 1) dependency on Bitcoin-Qt 2) Poor UX (eg: after sending money I have to wait for two screen changes and a potential popup before the transaction is done and none of this is messaged to the user) 3) Constant crashes 4) Bad update system (I was repeatedly prompted to update to 93

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Beginner's guide: Installing Bitcoin Armory on Windows 7

FROM A BITCOIN QT WALLET: ... In your Bitcoin Armory wallet your private key can be found by double-clicking your wallet in the Armory main window, click “Backup this wallet”, then select ... How to make an offline bitcoin wallet using Armory - Duration: 14:55. TheMetaTainment 38,398 views. 14:55. How Bitcoin Works Under the Hood - Duration: 22:25. CuriousInventor Recommended for you. How to make an offline bitcoin wallet using Armory - Duration: 14:55. TheMetaTainment 38,494 views. 14:55. PRISMicide for Bitcoin: ... I'm going to do a demo of Bitcoin Armory basic functionality and answer questions from a new user. ... How to Download and Verify the Armory Bitcoin Wallet - Duration: 22:31. Rex Kneisley 4,925 views. How to install Armory 0.93 and Bitcoin Core 0.10 on Windows 7, and how to create your first wallet. A guide for beginners. Enable subtitles in the video. If you like the guide, feel free to send a ...

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